What is a boring business in ETA?

In the context of entrepreneurship through acquisition (ETA), a 'boring business' refers to an established, cash-flowing small business in an unsexy sector — HVAC, plumbing, pest control, laundromats, car washes, janitorial services, pool services, landscaping, and similar trades and services businesses. The appeal is that these businesses have proven demand, limited technology disruption risk, and motivated seller-owners approaching retirement age. The caveat the ETA influencer space underemphasizes: not all boring businesses have good margins. Janitorial averages 5–10% EBITDA. HVAC averages 15–25%. The sector label matters far less than the specific business's financial profile.

Is buying a business better than starting one?

On a survival rate basis, yes: approximately 60–70% of acquired businesses survive to year five, versus approximately 50% of newly started businesses. However, the comparison is incomplete without accounting for acquisition price. You are paying $300,000–$3,000,000+ for an existing business's established customer base and cash flow — the question is whether the purchase price represents fair value for that risk-reduction. Acquiring a declining business at a high multiple is significantly worse than starting a new business in a growing market. The data favors acquisition — but only at the right price for the right business.

ETA · Boring Business Guide · 2026 Reality Check

The Lies About Buying Boring Businesses — And What's Actually True (2026)

Q: Is buying a boring business a good idea?

Buying an existing profitable business is generally a better risk-adjusted path than starting from scratch — but only when the acquisition is correctly priced, the financials are clean and verified, and you have the operational and management skills to maintain performance. The 'boring business' framing oversimplifies what is a complex transaction. Many boring businesses have low margins (5–15% SDE) that produce poor returns on the acquisition capital deployed. The businesses worth buying are the ones with strong recurring revenue, low owner dependency, and defensible competitive positions — not simply the ones that are unglamorous.

Q: How much money do you need to buy a small business?

To buy a $1 million business through an SBA 7(a) loan, you need approximately $100,000–$150,000 as a down payment (10–15%), plus closing costs of $15,000–$30,000, personal liquidity reserves that lenders require post-close (typically 10–15% of the loan value), and working capital of 3–6 months of operating expenses. The all-in capital requirement to close a $1M acquisition is typically $200,000–$300,000. For deals above $5M (lower middle market), the equity requirement rises to 20–30% minimum.

Q: What is the biggest mistake first-time business buyers make?

Overpaying for owner dependency. The single most common fatal acquisition error is buying a business where the existing owner is the primary driver of revenue — the key relationship for all major customers, the technical expert clients call, the face every supplier deals with. When that owner leaves, the business may not retain its earnings at the level used to price the acquisition. This risk does not appear on the income statement. It requires operational due diligence to identify, and many first-time buyers do not do it.

Den Unglin Last updated: May 2026 22 min read

Somewhere between 2021 and now, "buy a boring business" became the new "build a startup." Codie Sanchez built a media empire on it. Search funds became cocktail party conversation. Every other finance influencer is posting about acquiring car washes and HVAC companies. And yes — the core idea is good. Buying an existing cash-flowing business is genuinely better than most alternatives people consider at the "what do I do with my life" stage.

But the Internet has turned a legitimate financial strategy into a simplified gospel that glosses over things you will definitely wish someone had told you before you signed a personal guarantee on a $1.8 million SBA loan. So here it is — the honest, data-backed version.

This article covers everything: what's real and what's hype in the ETA movement, how to actually buy a business in 2026, the math behind acquisition financing, which "boring" businesses have the margins worth acquiring, why 40–50% of acquisitions underperform, and — at the end — a path most people in this space never consider that captures most of the upside with a fraction of the risk.

1. What's Real and What's Hype in the ETA Movement

The core insight behind "buy boring businesses" is correct and has been correct for decades before anyone put it on TikTok. An existing, profitable business in a stable, low-glamour sector — HVAC, pest control, plumbing, laundromats, car washes, landscaping — comes with an established customer base, trained staff, and a revenue history you can actually analyse. You are buying a proven model, not a hypothesis.

The data supports this. Entrepreneurship Through Acquisition (ETA) has been studied at business schools since the 1980s. Stanford's Entrepreneurship Survey Center tracks search fund returns longitudinally. The numbers show that properly structured acquisitions — specifically search funds targeting $1M–$5M EBITDA businesses — produce median pre-tax returns of 33% IRR to investors and 5–10× invested capital to acquirers over a 5–7 year hold period. Those are legitimately excellent returns.

But the version that travels on social media is not the Stanford search fund study. It is a sanitised, worst-cases-removed, emotionally compelling narrative that collapses a complex transaction process into a lifestyle upgrade story. The part where you have a personal guarantee on $1.8 million in debt secured by your house does not make for good content.

"The boring business thesis is correct. The boring business content industry is not. One of them is a rigorous financial strategy with a 40-year track record. The other is an aesthetic."

What the ETA movement gets right: existing cash flow is worth more than a business plan. The boomer exit wave is producing a once-in-a-generation supply of motivated sellers. SBA financing makes businesses accessible to buyers who could not fund acquisitions through private equity. Unsexy sectors have real competitive moats — no one is disrupting a local plumbing company with an app.

What it underemphasises: margins vary enormously by sector. Owner dependency is an invisible risk that financials cannot capture. SBA personal guarantees are irrevocable. Integration is hard. And the "boring business" market has been discovered — quality deals in obvious niches now trade at 4–6× SDE, not 2–3×, which changes the return math significantly.

2. The Hype vs Reality Comparison

What the content says

What the data shows

"Boring businesses are low risk."

Low competition ≠ low risk. Owner dependency, integration risk, customer concentration, and financing risk are all real. ~40–50% of acquisitions underperform acquisition price projections within 3 years.

"Any cash-flowing business is worth buying."

Margins determine whether the acquisition makes financial sense. A janitorial company at 8% EBITDA bought at 4× EBITDA returns 2% annually before debt service. That is not a business acquisition — it is a full-time job with personal guarantee upside.

"You can buy a business with no money down."

SBA 7(a) requires 10% minimum down payment, personal guarantees, and post-close liquidity reserves. The all-in capital requirement for a $1M acquisition is $200,000–$300,000. Seller financing for the remaining equity slice is common but not guaranteed.

"Boring businesses have predictable, recession-proof cash flow."

Many do — until a key contract ends, a key employee leaves, or the owner stops selling and the pipeline dries up. Recurring revenue in services businesses is often more fragile than it appears. The first 12 months post-acquisition are the highest risk period in any deal.

"ETA is easier than starting a business."

It is different, not necessarily easier. Managing an acquired business with existing employees, customers, supplier relationships, and cultural dynamics requires specific operational skills. First-time acquirers with no management experience of established businesses have higher failure rates than experienced operators.

"The deal flow is endless — there are millions of businesses for sale."

Quality deal flow is finite. Businesses with clean financials, true recurring revenue, low owner dependency, and defensible margins in a growing sector — at a price that produces acceptable post-debt returns — are a small fraction of what is listed. Searching 12–24 months to find one quality target is normal.

"Seller financing makes this accessible for everyone."

Sellers offer financing when they have to, not because they want to. A seller with a clean, well-represented business and multiple buyers competing for it does not need to offer seller financing. The best deals have the least seller financing. The most accessible deals have the most seller dependency risk.

3. Not All Boring Is Equal: Margins by Sector

Here is the thing about boring businesses that nobody puts in a viral tweet: boring is not the relevant variable. Margins are. A 5% EBITDA business bought at 4× is a 1.25% annual return on acquisition cost before debt service. A 35% EBITDA business bought at the same multiple is a different investment entirely.

Before you chase any business type, run this check: what is the typical EBITDA margin in this sector, and what is the typical acquisition multiple? The difference between the two — your unlevered yield — is your starting economics before debt service, management replacement costs, and the inevitable capital expenditures the previous owner deferred.

← scroll to see all columns

Business type	Typical EBITDA margin	Typical multiple (2026)	Recurring revenue?	Owner dependency risk	Verdict
🏠 Residential HVAC	15–25%	4–6× EBITDA	Service contracts — high	Medium	Strong buy target
🚗 Car Wash (express)	25–40%	6–10× EBITDA	Monthly memberships — high	Low	Strong buy target
🐛 Pest Control	20–30%	4–6× EBITDA	Annual/quarterly contracts — high	Low–medium	Strong buy target
🦷 Dental Practice	20–35%	5–8× EBITDA	Patient base — medium	High (clinical)	Good with right operator
🏊 Pool Service	18–28%	3–5× EBITDA	Weekly service routes — high	Low	Strong buy target
🔒 IT/MSP Services	15–25%	5–8× EBITDA	Managed service contracts — high	Medium	Strong buy target
🐾 Veterinary Practice	12–20%	8–14× EBITDA	Repeat clients — medium	High (clinical)	PE-priced, clinical risk
🌿 Landscaping	10–18%	3–5× EBITDA	Maintenance contracts — medium	Medium–high	Verify contract stickiness
🚰 Plumbing/Electrical	12–20%	3–5× EBITDA	Service agreements — low	High	Verify owner dependency
🏪 Laundromat	10–20%	3–5× SDE	Location-dependent — medium	Low	Equipment capex risk
🧹 Commercial Cleaning	5–12%	2–4× EBITDA	Commercial contracts — medium	High (labour)	Thin margins, high churn
🍕 Restaurant / Food Service	3–10%	1.5–3× SDE	None — transactional	Very high	Avoid unless expert
🛒 Retail (physical)	3–8%	1.5–3× SDE	None — transactional	High	Secular headwinds

The pattern is clear: businesses with high recurring revenue, low owner dependency, and margins above 18% are the ones that attract PE roll-up capital — which means they now trade at higher multiples. You are competing with professional acquirers in the best niches. The businesses that remain cheap are cheap for a reason: thin margins, difficult labour models, high customer churn, or owner dependency risk.

The filter that actually works: Before researching any business type, ask two questions — (1) what percentage of revenue renews automatically or by contract, and (2) what would happen to that revenue if the current owner was removed from day-to-day operations for 90 days? The answers to those two questions determine 80% of acquisition quality, regardless of sector label.

4. How to Buy a Business in 2026: The Complete Guide

The acquisition process is more standardised than it appears from the outside. Whether you are buying a $500K pool service company or a $10M HVAC platform, the stages are the same. The complexity, timeline, and capital requirements scale with deal size — the steps do not change.

Months 0–3 Define Your Acquisition Criteria Geography, sector, deal size, deal structure (owner-operated vs management-in-place), minimum EBITDA/SDE, revenue concentration limits, post-acquisition role. Without written criteria, you will waste months evaluating businesses that are wrong for you. Include what you will not buy — it saves more time than what you will. Deliverable: 1-page acquisition criteria document

Months 1–12+ Deal Sourcing — Finding the Right Business Three channels: on-market (BizBuySell, Axial, broker listings — competitive, priced to market), direct outreach (letters/calls to owner-operated businesses in your target sector — time-intensive, best pricing), and broker relationships (build relationships with specialist brokers in your target niche — they send pre-marketed deals to qualified buyers first). Expect 6–18 months and reviewing 50–200+ businesses to find one worth serious due diligence. Deliverable: qualified deal pipeline with 3–5 active targets

Weeks 1–4 (on target) Initial Analysis — CIM Review and Preliminary Valuation When a deal passes initial criteria, request the Confidential Information Memorandum and 3 years of financial statements. Recast the financials — add back legitimate owner compensation, non-recurring expenses, and personal expenses run through the business to arrive at normalised SDE or EBITDA. Apply current market multiples for your niche. If the preliminary valuation supports your return requirements, proceed to LOI. Deliverable: normalised financials + preliminary valuation range

Weeks 3–6 Letter of Intent (LOI) A non-binding offer letter specifying deal structure, purchase price, payment terms, deal structure (asset vs stock), exclusivity period (typically 30–60 days), and key conditions. The LOI is negotiated before due diligence begins. Getting the price and structure right here matters — post-LOI price renegotiation is technically possible but relationship-damaging and increases deal failure risk. Use a business transaction attorney. Deliverable: signed LOI with 30–60 day exclusivity

Weeks 4–12 Due Diligence — The Most Important Stage Financial due diligence: verify the recast financials against source documents — bank statements, tax returns, accounts receivable aging, payroll records, vendor contracts. Operational due diligence: how dependent is the business on the owner? What do employees actually do? Which customers would leave if the owner left? Legal due diligence: review all contracts, leases, licences, litigation history, IP ownership. Environmental and regulatory if applicable. This stage will find surprises. Most good deals survive them with price adjustments. Some deals die here. Both outcomes are better than closing uninformed. Duration: 30–90 days depending on complexity

Concurrent with DD Financing — SBA 7(a) or Alternative Structures For deals under $5M, SBA 7(a) is the primary mechanism — 10% minimum down, personal guarantee required, 10-year term at SOFR + 2.5–3%. Get pre-qualified before you submit an LOI — lenders will want to see your personal financials, liquid assets, and industry experience. Alternatives: seller financing (seller holds 10–25% of purchase price as a subordinated note), earnout structures (portion of purchase price conditional on post-close performance), and equity partners / independent sponsors for larger deals. Deliverable: financing commitment letter before closing

Weeks 10–16 Purchase Agreement and Closing The Asset Purchase Agreement (or Stock Purchase Agreement) is the binding legal document — drafted by attorneys, reviewed by both sides. Expect 2–4 weeks of negotiation on representations, warranties, indemnification caps, escrow/holdback provisions, and transition support terms. At closing, funds transfer, ownership transfers, and the transition period begins. Budget $15,000–$40,000 in total professional fees (attorneys, accountant, broker) for a deal in the $500K–$2M range. Deliverable: signed SPA + fund transfer + ownership transfer

Months 1–12 post-close The Integration Period — Where Most Acquisitions Succeed or Fail The first 90 days are when key customers discover a new owner. Key employees decide whether to stay. Supplier relationships test the new operator. Revenue may dip before it recovers. Having a documented 30-60-90 day transition plan negotiated before closing — with seller support explicitly scheduled — is not a nice-to-have. It is what separates acquisitions that compound from acquisitions that consume their acquirer. Risk period: first 12 months post-close

5. The Acquisition Math No One Shows You

Let us run the actual numbers on a typical first acquisition: a $1 million purchase price for a residential services business generating $250,000 in normalised SDE (4× multiple). This is an approximately average deal for a first-time acquirer in 2026.

$1M acquisition — complete cost model

What It Actually Costs to Buy a $1M Business

Capital required at closing

Down payment (10% SBA minimum) $100,000

SBA guarantee fee (~3.5% on loan amount) $31,500

Attorney fees (buyer side) $8,000–$15,000

Accountant / financial due diligence $5,000–$10,000

Broker fee (if buyer side representation) $0 (paid by seller) or $5,000–$10,000

Working capital (lender may require 3 months) $30,000–$60,000

Post-close liquidity reserve (lender requirement) $90,000–$135,000

All-in capital requirement $264,500–$351,500

Annual return model

Normalised SDE (purchase basis) $250,000

Annual SBA debt service (10yr, ~8% rate) — $108,000

Management replacement salary (if owner-operator) — $75,000–$100,000

Deferred capex (equipment, vehicles, systems) — $10,000–$30,000

Real free cash flow, year 1 $12,000–$57,000

Return on deployed capital in year 1: approximately 4–16% — before any management salary you pay yourself. The business is profitable. The acquisition is not yet compounding meaningfully. Year 3–5 is where the economics improve dramatically as debt service reduces and revenue (hopefully) grows. The critical point: this only works if the SDE holds post-close. A 15% revenue decline — which is common in the first year with an owner transition — turns this model negative.

The personal guarantee reality: Every SBA 7(a) loan above $25,000 requires an unconditional personal guarantee. If the business fails, you owe the full loan balance from personal assets. This is not fine print — it is the central risk of the acquisition model. Anyone presenting ETA as "low risk" without discussing personal guarantees is telling you an incomplete story.

6. Buying a Business vs Starting One: The Data-Driven Choice

The comparison between buying and starting is usually framed emotionally. It should be framed mathematically.

Buying an existing business

5-year survival rate~60–70% of acquired businesses (source: various ETA programme studies, Harvard Business School search fund data)

Time to cash flowDay one — you are buying existing cash flow. No ramp period required.

Capital required$200K–$500K+ for a $1M–$3M acquisition. Non-negotiable personal guarantee.

Revenue uncertaintyHistorical revenue exists — but may not persist post-acquisition depending on owner dependency and customer concentration.

Competition for dealsHigh and rising — the "boring business" narrative has significantly increased buyer competition for quality assets.

Failure modeOverpayment + owner dependency + revenue decline in year 1. Personal guarantee at risk.

Advantage: faster path to established cash flow if correctly priced and managed.

Starting from scratch

5-year survival rate~50% of new businesses survive 5 years (BLS data, US). ~20% reach year 1 profitability.

Time to cash flow12–36 months to meaningful revenue for most service businesses. Capital intensive during ramp period.

Capital required$10K–$100K to launch most service businesses. No personal guarantee on startup capital.

Revenue uncertaintyZero historical revenue. You are building everything from zero — customer relationships, staff, processes, brand.

CompetitionYou are creating your own market position — no existing buyer competition, but no built-in competitive moat either.

Failure modeInsufficient runway, customer acquisition cost, or founder dependency. Sunk cost of time and capital — but no personal guarantee.

Disadvantage: longer path to revenue, higher execution risk, no guaranteed customer base.

The data clearly favours acquisition on survival rates and time to cash flow. But the comparison is incomplete without the capital variable. Starting a service business requires $10,000–$100,000. Acquiring one requires $200,000–$500,000, secured by a personal guarantee. The survival rate advantage of acquisition needs to justify that additional capital deployment and the personal guarantee risk — which it does for many people, but not universally.

There is a third option this comparison ignores entirely, which we will get to later.

7. What Actually Kills Acquisitions

The ETA failure modes are well-documented. Here they are in order of frequency, based on post-acquisition studies from HBS, Stanford, and practitioner surveys:

35%

Owner dependency — the invisible risk The business's revenue was more attached to the selling owner than the financials indicated. Key customers leave with the founder. Key suppliers tighten terms without the personal relationship. Revenue declines 15–30% in year one and never recovers to the level used to price the acquisition. This risk does not appear on any financial statement. It requires operational due diligence: talking to customers, talking to employees, and stress-testing the business without the owner for 90 days.

25%

Overestimated earnings — SDE recasting errors The seller's SDE recast included add-backs that did not hold under scrutiny. Non-recurring expenses that recur. Owner compensation recasts that did not account for the full cost of replacing the owner's work. Revenue including one-time contracts counted as recurring. The acquisition was priced on earnings that don't exist in the normalised business the buyer actually purchased.

20%

Integration failure — operational incompetence The acquirer had the capital and found a good business but lacked the specific operational experience to manage it. Managing existing staff (who may resent the new owner), maintaining vendor relationships, handling the daily operational demands of a service business — these are different skills from finding and financing a deal. First-time acquirers with no prior management experience of established businesses have materially higher failure rates.

12%

Market deterioration — bought at peak The acquirer bought a business at peak earnings — a period of unusually high demand that normalised post-acquisition. This is common in any sector that had a demand surge in recent years. Post-COVID service businesses in several niches experienced 2020–2022 revenue peaks that were not sustainable baselines.

Financing stress — debt service crushes cash flow A minor revenue shortfall combined with an aggressive debt service schedule produces a cash flow crisis within 6–18 months. The business is operationally viable but financially unmanageable. Often the result of overpaying at acquisition and optimising the financing structure to make the numbers work at max leverage rather than at a realistic valuation.

Notice what is not on this list: competition from new entrants, technology disruption, economic recession. Those are real risks but they are not the primary killers of small business acquisitions. The primary killers are due diligence failures and operational misjudgements that were identifiable before closing.

8. Buying a Business with No Experience: Is It Possible?

Yes. Technically. People do it. The question is whether the risk profile makes sense given your specific situation — and whether it is actually the optimal path to the outcome you are trying to achieve.

Path A — High capital risk Buy a business anyway with limited experience Possible. Done regularly. The failure rate for first-time acquirers with no prior business management experience is substantially higher than for operators with relevant background. The personal guarantee is real. If you have $300K+ to deploy, 18 months to search, operational experience in a related sector, and the appetite for the specific risks outlined above — this path is viable. If you are relying entirely on the income from the acquisition to replace your salary from day one, the margin for error is very thin.

Path B — Lower risk, longer timeline Partner with an operator or join a search fund Much better for first-timers. A co-acquirer with operational experience in the target sector addresses the integration failure risk directly. Search fund structures distribute the risk between investors and the searcher. An acquisition entrepreneur programme (ETA MBA tracks at Stanford, HBS, MIT Sloan) provides the network, deal flow, and investor relationships that solo searchers take years to build. The tradeoff is equity dilution — you own less of the outcome.

Path C — The alternative most people never consider Advise on these deals instead of buying them Lowest capital requirement. No personal guarantee. Same knowledge base. Different economic model. The skills you need to identify, evaluate, and close a good acquisition are identical to the skills a business broker or M&A advisor uses to represent sellers in those same transactions. The advisor earns 8–12% of the transaction value as a success fee — on deals they do not own, at no personal financial risk. The knowledge required is the same. The economics are different. We explore this fully in the next section.

9. The Alternative Path: Advising Instead of Owning

Here is the thing nobody in the ETA content space is incentivised to tell you: you can participate in the exact same transaction economy — the same businesses, the same buyers, the same deal structures — without putting up $300,000 and signing a personal guarantee. You can do it as the advisor.

A business broker or independent M&A advisor represents the seller in a transaction. They source the deal, value the business, package it for market, identify qualified buyers, manage due diligence, and negotiate the sale through to closing. For that service, they earn 8–12% of the transaction value at closing — typically $40,000–$200,000+ per deal.

Compare that to the acquisition model directly:

Two ways to participate in the same market

Buyer vs Advisor: The Economics Side by Side

You as the buyer

Capital required: $200K–$500K

Personal guarantee: Yes, irrevocable

Year 1 cash flow: $12K–$57K (after debt service)

Risk of loss: Personal assets at risk

Time to first income: Day 1 if deal closes

Upside: Business equity appreciation

Failure mode: Personal insolvency if wrong

You as the advisor

Capital required: $997 to start

Personal guarantee: None

Year 1 income: $50K–$300K+ from 1–3 closings

Risk of loss: Time — no financial loss

Time to first income: 6–10 months (first closing)

Upside: Uncapped — scales with deals closed

Failure mode: Pipeline dries up — start again

The advisor model is not a consolation prize for people who cannot afford to buy. It is a different economic model with asymmetric risk/reward that many serious M&A practitioners choose over ownership deliberately. You are not building equity in a single business — you are building a transaction network that compounds. Every deal you close adds to your sector reputation, your buyer relationships, and your inbound mandate flow.

The knowledge required to identify a good business acquisition — valuation, SDE normalisation, deal structure, buyer qualification — is exactly the knowledge an advisor applies to represent sellers. You need to learn the same material. One path requires $300K and a personal guarantee. The other requires a $997 training investment.

The most successful business advisors in this sector came from exactly the ETA-curious background: they understood the businesses, they could speak the language of acquisition, and they had sector relationships that produced mandates. They chose to be the person who gets paid to close the deal rather than the person who owns the result.

You Already Know the Businesses. Now Learn the Other Side of the Table.

If you've read this far, you understand acquisition economics. You know what makes a good business. You know the risks of buying. The Career Strategy Session takes that knowledge and maps it to a specific sector and network where you could close your first advisory mandate — without the personal guarantee, without the $300,000, and with the same deal flow as the buyers you've been reading about.

Which businesses in your sector network are closest to an exit conversation today
How to approach that conversation without sounding like a sales pitch
The engagement letter structure that protects your success fee from day one
What your first year income model looks like based on your specific starting position

Career Strategy Session — $997 →

FAQ: Buying Boring Businesses

Is buying a boring business a good idea?

Buying an existing profitable business is generally better than starting from scratch on a risk-adjusted basis — but only when correctly priced, with clean verified financials, and when you have the operational skills to maintain performance post-acquisition. The "boring business" framing oversimplifies a complex transaction. Many boring businesses have thin margins (5–15% EBITDA) that produce poor returns on acquisition capital. The businesses worth buying are the ones with strong recurring revenue, low owner dependency, and defensible competitive positions — not simply the unglamorous ones.

How much money do you need to buy a small business?

For a $1 million business through an SBA 7(a) loan: approximately $100,000 down payment (10%), plus $31,500 SBA guarantee fee, $15,000–$25,000 in professional fees, and post-close liquidity reserves of $90,000–$135,000 that lenders require. Total all-in capital: $250,000–$350,000 minimum. For deals above $5M (lower middle market), the equity requirement rises to 20–30% plus a more complex financing stack. Anyone saying you can buy a meaningful business for $10,000 is not describing a legitimate SBA-financed acquisition.

What is the biggest mistake first-time business buyers make?

Overpaying for owner dependency. The most common fatal acquisition error is buying a business where the existing owner is the primary driver of revenue — the key relationship for all major customers, the technical expert clients call, the face every supplier deals with. When that owner leaves, the business may not retain the earnings used to price the acquisition. This risk does not appear on the income statement. It requires operational due diligence: asking customers what they would do if the owner sold, interviewing employees about their roles without the owner present, and requesting a 90-day ownership transition before full handover.

Is the "boring business" niche too competitive now?

For obvious high-quality targets in well-known niches — HVAC, pest control, car washes — yes, buyer competition has increased significantly since 2020. These businesses now trade at 4–6× or higher EBITDA, reducing the returns that made them attractive at 2–3× five years ago. The less-competed opportunity is in sectors that have not yet been popularised by content creators: niche B2B services, technical trade services, regional distribution, specific healthcare sub-sectors. Finding quality off-market deals through direct outreach takes longer but produces significantly better pricing than on-market competition.

What does a business broker actually do, and why would I work with one?

A business broker represents the seller in a business sale transaction — valuing the business, preparing marketing materials, sourcing qualified buyers, managing due diligence, and negotiating through to closing. Their fee (8–12% of transaction value) is paid by the seller at closing. As a buyer, working with a listing broker gives you access to pre-packaged deals with verified financials and motivated sellers — reducing your sourcing time significantly. A buyer's advisor (less common) represents only your interests in the transaction. For first-time buyers, working with a specialist broker who knows your target sector is often the most efficient way to access quality deal flow. See what business brokers actually do →

Codie Sanchez says to buy boring businesses — is she wrong?

No — the core thesis is correct and well-supported by data. Existing, cash-flowing businesses in stable sectors are better risk-adjusted investments than most alternatives. The issue is not Codie Sanchez's analysis — she built a media company on legitimate financial insight and deserves credit for making ETA concepts accessible. The issue is what the broader content ecosystem has done with the idea: removing the personal guarantee discussion, removing the owner dependency risk, presenting the best-case economics as typical, and creating the impression that this is accessible to anyone without significant capital or management experience. The thesis is sound. The simplified version circulating on social media is incomplete.

About the Author

Den Unglin — Practising Business Broker and M&A Exit Adviser

Den Unglin Broker · M&A Adviser · Bangkok

Den represents the sellers of the businesses the ETA community is trying to buy.

Den is a practising M&A advisor — he works with business owners on sell-side exits and has represented both sides of the table on enough transactions to have opinions about what the content space gets right and wrong. Nothing on this page is theoretical.

Den is a practising business broker and M&A exit adviser with 18+ years of direct P&L experience across 50+ business types and 12 markets. He advises on transactions across 4 continents and maintains relationships with a global network of PE and family offices.

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18+Years direct
P&L experience

50+Business types
across the career

12Country
markets

4Continents advised
US · EU · ASIA · AU